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ABSTRACT 
A DURKHEIMIAN SOCIOBIOLOGY? 
 
As conceived by Durkheim, social facts set parameters on what is of sociological interest and 
subsequently how social phenomena are explained. This thesis reworks this theoretical concept 
to allow for biological explanations of some social phenomena. It by no means asserts that all 
social phenomena can be explained by biology, but it recognizes that biological explanations of 
human behavior are available and are of sociological interest. The argument agrees with the main 
thrust of Durkheims defense of social facts, but his critique of utility, while insightful, is 
considered unnecessary to negate individual causality.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Social phenomena can have a biological or evolutionary explanation and such an 
assertion is compatible with a Durkheimian perspective. If such an assertion holds, then the 
possibility of a Durkheimian sociobiology is conceivable. 
Durkheims Rules of Sociological Method (1895) establishes the theoretical anchor, i.e., 
social fact, and to what it refers. He argues that the nature of social phenomena is irreducible 
to other types of phenomena, in particular physiological and psychological. As a result Lukes 
(1972) claims that Rules distinguish the social from the biological, egoistic from altruistic, which 
are from there on perceived as analytically distinct types of facts. 
Durkheims seminal text is styled as a manifesto. This may account for the harsh 
negation of biological, psychological, or even philosophical accounts of society in his writing. It 
is a style often taken by Durkheim and is evident in other texts as well. Durkheim has been 
criticized for this by later theorists. Alpert (1961) notes, book 1 of Suicide overstates the case for 
social facts in its single-minded devotion to eliminating psychopathic, psychological, biological, 
and cosmic theories of suicide (1961:87). Gehke asserts Durkheims claim falls apart in regard to 
social facts and their origin (1968:66-67).  
Literature Review: An Evolutionary Critique 
The scope of critiques available on Durkheim is enormous. Not only is the mere size 
intimidating, the subject matter is broad. This thesis is primarily interested in the evolutionary 
psychological critique of Durkheims theory.  
Recent critiques suggest biological causes of social behavior are invisible or irrelevant to 
the social sciences (Tooby & Cosmides 1992; Udry 1994). While giving conceptual closure to a 
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discipline, social fact as defined exclusively or predominately as a socio-environmental concept 
limits what can be of sociological interest. In contrast to Durkheims perspective, critics assert 
that the evolutionary makeup of the individual is crucial to understanding social phenomena. By 
restricting the scope of social phenomena as irreducible to the individual, Durkheim undermines 
the importance of the individual in social causality and subsequently sidelines biological and 
psychological explanations as well. 
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) define the Standard Social Science Model as the view of 
the nature of social and cultural phenomena that has served for a century as the intellectual 
framework for the organization of psychology and the social sciences and the intellectual 
justification for their claims of autonomy from the rest of science (p. 23). Of course, 
Durkheims social fact attempts to theoretically assert the autonomy of sociology. Therefore, 
Durkheims Rules (1895) are directly tied to the Standard Social Science Model. In the Rules, 
Durkheim states: individual natures are merely the indeterminate material that the social factors 
mold and transform ([1895]1932:105). While Tooby and Cosmides recognize the Standard 
Social Science Model has value, they believe that its theoretical principles serve to isolate it from 
the other sciences. 
The problem with such criticisms is that they define a social fact in a socio-environmental 
manner and critique from this perspective. They miss an opportunity, however, to expand a very 
general concept. The point is that Durkheims social fact is not necessarily contrary to 
evolutionary theory. It is true that social facts need reworking, but such a theory is not limiting 
and useless to the social sciences. Demonstrating that some social facts have an evolutionary 
explanation is a useful contribution to knowledge concerning the nature of social phenomena.     
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Method:  Content Analysis of Durkheims First Seminal Work  
This is a non-intrusive conceptual critique of Durkheims account of social facts, i.e., a 
logical exposition and evaluation of Durkheims claim to expand and defend the scope of his key 
concept. His Rules of Sociological Method (1895) will be the primary text of interest. Other 
relevant essays by Durkheim and contemporary evolutionary theorists (e.g. Hamilton, Trivers, 
Wilson, etc.) are discussed.
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CHAPTER 2 
SOCIAL FACTS 
Durkheim defines a social fact as every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of 
exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general 
throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its 
individual manifestations ([1895]1938:13). It [social fact] is a metaphysical force exerted upon 
the individual. He attributes three overlapping criteria essentially proving it as fact, i.e., a thing. 
They are its general character, its coercive action, and its independent existence. It is important 
to clarify that the general criteria are properties social facts have and display. 
  What exactly Durkheim is referring to when speaking of social facts is very general. At 
times, the term refers to society in general, other times it refers to smaller scale groups such as 
family, the Republican Party, etc. The definition allows for social facts to be both material 
(technology and institutions) and non-material phenomena (collective psychology). It can be a 
case of demographics (a nations birth rate) or collective representations (widespread belief in 
individual liberty). What is consistent is the conception of the social, which is fundamentally a 
relation of two as the unit of analysis at a minimum. It is individuals in association and 
interacting with each other. It is important to remember that Durkheim attempts to establish 
social facts as irreducible to individuals. Therefore, it is also something more than the sum of 
individuals in association. Social facts must be seen as distinct from their individual 
manifestations. Moreover, statistical rates provide evidence of such a method of analysis. It 
depends on there being individual cases but operates on the whole with individual cases grouped 
together as an average of individual cases. The social realities of marriage rates, suicide rates, 
divorce rates, birth rates, death rates, and so on are completely independent of their individual 
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manifestations. Social facts must be seen as things (ibid: 14). Statistics only illustrate the 
existence of social facts; it shouldnt be reduced to averages. 
The Criteria 
According to Durkheim, constraint, or coercion, has its psychological basis in the supra-
individual character of social phenomena. It is greater than the individual, therefore, more 
powerful and coercive. The individual has no other option but to conform in some manner to the 
pressure exerted by the existing social facts or face consequences. For example, civil codes or 
law illustrates the coercive character placed on individuals. They are restrictive in nature. 
Education is a continuous attempt to impose on the student certain perspectives, which he or she 
could not come to have in isolation from social phenomena. It is socialization. 
It is important to note that the use of coercion is misleading. While this usage is certainly 
appropriate for some social facts, others do not imply coercion. They may very well be accepted 
without question or may even be useful to the individual. For example, speaking the same 
language will allow for more efficient interactions, or at least more efficient than speaking to one 
another in languages unknown to the other, assuming efficiency is a value. 
Social facts are general due to the coercive character. The number of people subject to the 
same specific social facts will, accordingly, have similar values, beliefs, and ways of acting. 
Why is it that most Americans speak English or share similar core values? Durkheim suggests 
that the general character is a result of social facts influence on the individuals ways of acting 
and so on. They are general because they are collective, not collective because they are general1.  
The third criterion is a culmination of the previous two criteria. Social facts are seen as 
independent of the individual manifestations that result. This solidifies the nature of Durkheims 
                                                
1 Durkheim states it this way to imply the social causality of social facts. He asserts that individuals actions are not 
the cause of collective phenomena. Therefore, they are general because they are collective. The emphasis is on the 
causal direction of social phenomena. 
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social fact as strictly social phenomena. It is a metaphysical assertion, claiming social facts to be 
independent or external to the individual (mind/idea). Durkheim writes, A thought which we 
find in every individual consciousness, a movement repeated by all individuals, is not thereby a 
social fact ([1938] 1895:6). It is the collective element Durkheim asserts is the focus of the 
social sciences not the individual reincarnations. The nature of social facts is collective. The 
emphasis is that social facts cannot be reduced to individual analysis; it is a relation of two or 
more as a unit in and of itself. It is a distinct categorical classification. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PROBLEM OF EMERGENCE 
Durkheim asserts, The determining causes of social facts should be sought among the 
social facts preceding it and not among the states of the individual consciousness ([1895]1938: 
110). Social facts are sui-generis. 
This statement is a sociological milestone. It provides the foundation for the science of 
sociology. Durkheim writes, There can be no sociology unless societies exist and that societies 
cannot exist if there are only individuals ([1897] 1979:38). Durkheims twofold objective: 
establish sociology as a science and defend the assertion that the subject matter of such a science 
is not reducible to the analysis of an isolated individual.  
Durkheims model of causality is social determinism. He writes in his 1914 essay, for 
example, We can say, therefore, with assurance and without being excessively dogmatic, that a 
great number of our mental states, including some of the most important ones, are of social 
origin. In this case, then, it is the whole that, in large measure, produces the parts ([1914] 
1973:149). It is the influence social facts have on individuals that produce social behaviors (i.e. 
ways of acting, thinking, etc.). Therefore, culture is not the product of individuals. To the 
contrary, individuals ways of acting, believing, and so forth are a product of social facts. The 
functions of the individual are interpreted and defined by the social context.  
Durkheim successfully defends the objective reality of social facts. For example, he 
states, even when we have collaborated in their genesis, we can only with difficulty obtain even 
a confused and inexact insight into the true nature of our action and the causes which determined 
it ([1895] 1938:xiv). Social facts have an individual component, but Durkheim, stresses that 
even in the event an individual is in some way causal to the emergence of social facts we must 
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not let such an effect overshadow the nature of social phenomena by asserting the individual is 
causal indefinitely. If the individual has an effect on social phenomena, it is not necessary to 
propose such facts originated from that source. 
Placing social forces outside the individual, at first, appears not to be problematic. 
However, Durkheim writes, Sociologycan be defined as the science of institutions, of their 
genesis and of their functioning ([1895]1938:lvi). This leaves a major question unanswered: 
what is the origin and genesis of social facts? Durkheim assumes the existence of social 
phenomena as self- evident without accounting for the genesis of the group or social phenomena. 
He does not provide an adequate theory of how individuals associate at the aggregate level. He 
simply presumes such phenomena as his starting point. 
While this theoretical model can account for various social behaviors, it does not provide 
an explanation concerning why individuals are disposed to behave in a social manner. In short, 
Durkheims theory of social facts needs a biological component that explains the genesis of 
social phenomena while at the same time avoiding individualistic explanations.
 13
CHAPTER 4 
THE PROBLEM OF UTILITY 
Durkheims positive argument emerges from a critique of a rival approach to the same 
problem, nineteenth century utilitarianism, which frames sociality as a by-product of individual 
utility. Utilitarian and rational choice theorists think of social behavior as directly benefiting 
individual interest and indirectly the interests of society. From such a viewpoint, social 
phenomena arise from individual utility and are measured by such means. Social facts are real. 
However, they are the product of individuals. In opposition to utilitarianism, Durkheim asserts 
If society is only a system of means instituted by men to attain certain ends, these ends can only 
be individual, for only individuals could have existed before society ([1895] 1938:97). If social 
facts can be explained by individual need and volition, then, as Durkheim writes, it can be 
established just as easily that organic phenomenon can be explained by inorganic matter 
(ibid:102). 
Durkheim posits a methodological holism as the only way out of the Hobbsiean 
dilemma2. It is the conditions of the group that determine the conduct of individuals. Durkheim 
writes collective representations, emotions, and tendencies are caused not by certain states of 
the consciousness of individuals but by the conditions in which the social group in its totality is 
placed (ibid:105). Durkheim sees the group as a unit of selection. Accordingly, the group 
level needs will produce individual behaviors. To Durkheim, social facts are collective 
phenomena and are far more complex and causally significant than the individual. Therefore, 
social facts cannot be adequately explained by individual-level analysis, i.e. the whole is not 
                                                
2 The Hobbsiean dilemma is known as the natural state of war between individuals. Sociality or lets say social facts 
(government, monarchy etc.) is a product of individual volition and utility and the only way out of a state of war, 
survival of the fittest. 
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identical with the sum of its parts (ibid:102). The asocial/social dichotomy present in 
Durkheims theory is a crucial and indispensable concept.  
Despite his opposition to utilitarianism, Durkheim does not provide a satisfactory 
alternative. He is quick to establish social facts as independent via their generality and 
coerciveness. For example, law cannot arise as the product of individual volition. Rather, it is to 
be seen as a product of social forces. We must presume a collective character before such things 
are even possible. In addition, we, as individuals, conform to social customs and laws that we did 
not create but only reaffirm. Sociality is a premise and not a product of our actions. 
The negation of individual causality serves to isolate social facts from any other cause 
than itself. While this impedes a clear account of their genesis, social facts cannot be a product of 
the individual. However, there is no satisfactory account of the genesis of social facts connecting 
them to the human condition. Social facts are presented in such a way that they fail to have an 
organic character to them. For if they are not contingent on the individual, how did such 
phenomena come to be? Explaining the genesis of social facts is a major problem for 
Durkheims theory. His critique of utility is insightful and provides an indispensable dichotomy: 
social and non social phenomena. 
Utility and Duty 
  Durkheims central thesis is that utility cannot account for the sense of obligation, 
constraint, and conformity imposed on the individual actor. Durkheim writes, If society were 
only the natural and spontaneous development of the individual, these two parts of ourselves 
would harmonize and adjust without clashing or friction ([1914]1973:162). Obligation or 
restriction placed upon the individual cannot merely be a product of individual reason or 
volition. The obligatory nature of social facts cannot come from him, nor can it be explained by 
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what happens within him ([1895] 1938:101). For example, laws or codes of conduct are 
restrictions that are rightfully external to the individual not the product of individuals. Similarly, 
the language one learns to speak is not usually by choice but through mimicry of an already 
established language group. 
  Durkheim speaks of a dual existence we lead concurrently: the one purely individual 
and rooted in our organism, the other social and nothing but an extension of society ([1914] 
1973:162). Conflicts of interest between the desires and needs of individuals and those stressed 
by society are present. They may often be synonymous but often contradict. Accordingly, the 
individual is seen as selfish and morality is a rule based system stressed by society and enforced 
by a sense of duty. For example, the religious institutions and subsequent beliefs are saturated 
with a sense of duty and consequence\reward in regards to moral activity. Social behavior cannot 
be presumed to arise from individual selection and individual causality, which cannot explain the 
limiting, restrictive character of obligation. 
If the unit of selection is the individual, one could deduce that the motivation to act 
socially is spurred by individual reward. If so, altruism is reduced to individual selfishness, 
suggesting egoism and altruism are not contradictory motives. How, then, can social behavior 
even be warranted at the individual level or even be referred to by such a nomenclature without 
appealing  to social pressure exerted upon the individual to act socially. If egoism is altruism, 
then pro-social behavior is selfish. For example, if codes of conduct are not injected with cost to 
the individual actor in violation, would such behavior exist? 
I agree with Durkheim. If the system of means (society and social behavior) is merely 
ends for the individual, then social facts in the form of collective organization can not exist, nor 
can we refer to it as society. If social facts are the product of individual attempts to satisfy self-
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interest, it is nothing other than the sum of self-interested individuals. Morality, then, is reduced 
to the duty of the individual to his or herself and provides the basis for ethics/morality. While an 
element of individual utility is present in pro-social behavior, Durkheim sees pro-social behavior 
to benefit others, or simply not the individual exclusively. 
Durkheims Conception of the Social: An Invalid Replacement of Utilitarianism 
  Durkheim recognizes that social facts have an individual component but problematically 
asserts that they have an extra-individual origin. Durkheim must logically assume a starting 
point, an axiom, so to speak. He writes, Individual minds, forming groups by mingling and 
fusing, give birth to a being, psychological if you will, but constituting a psychic individuality of 
a new sort ([1895] 1938:103). This association of individuals takes on the property of a 
collective entity. Accordingly, social phenomena depend and differ upon the way in which this 
association is arranged. The first of all origins of all social processes of any importance should 
be sought in the internal constitution of the group (ibid: 113). The quantitative aspect of the 
association Durkheim labels social morphology is essentially of a demographic character 
(macro-objective phenomena). Morphological facts produce evaluative representations 
(collective consciousness/representations), i.e., how the group comes to identify with itself 
(macro-subjective phenomena). It is the relation of social morphology and collective 
consciousness that produces social phenomena. In other words, when people are contained 
within a close geographic area, they produce a group that in some way must identify with itself. 
Despite Durkheims insight to the problem of utility and the nature of social phenomena, 
his theory makes a metaphysical move in anthropomorphizing society (i.e. psychic individuality 
of a new sort) and giving this entity causal primacy in relation to social behavior. This move is 
difficult to defend when recognizing that society is dependent on there being individuals in order 
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to exist. But we can agree that the individual alone is not responsible for the existence of social 
facts. 
  In addition, social facts appear to be entirely relative. There is no ground for collective 
representations other than social morphology and a metaphysical assertion of a collective entity. 
The unanswered question, then, is why do individuals engage in social behavior or associate in 
the given manners. This is theoretically murky at best, unaccounted for at worst. If we move the 
level of analysis to the genetic, we can explain the relationship between individual and society 
while maintaining the general criteria of social facts.
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CHAPTER 5 
GENETIC SOCIAL FACTS: An Alternative Level of Analysis 
Because of Durkheims overwhelming concern with social solidarity and revulsion to 
anarchist tendencies within modern industrial society, he overstated the critique of utilitarianism. 
His explanation of the genesis of social facts depends heavily on the negation of utility and a 
metaphysical assertion of society as a being, a collective entity. Durkheim failed to muster 
existing theoretical resources in utilitarianism. Fortunately, one does not have to negate 
utilitarianism to negate individual causality. Likewise, Durkheim rejected biological causes of 
social phenomena because he viewed them as exclusively individualistic phenomena implying a 
Hobbsiean state of war between individuals. Biological facts were constant and given within 
each individual. Biological phenomena are equated to individual level phenomena and provide 
an inadequate explanation of social phenomena.  
This conceptual collapsing of levels of analysis (social/asocial) with levels of causality 
(environmental/biological) only produces conceptual unclarity. Conceptually, biological/genetic 
phenomena are not exhaustively reducible to individual causality. Sociobiology is defined by 
Wilson (1975: 4) as the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior and such a 
perspective is compatible with the criteria of social facts. 
In proposing that social facts be classified into two inter-related types, genetic and non-
genetic, evolutionary theory becomes relevant to sociology. Suggesting an evolutionary 
sociology by no means diminishes the influence of social facts. It merely changes our perception 
of them. 
  The general range of behavior attributed to social facts is broad. A key question must be 
posed: can non-genetic environmental social facts explain all of the given ways of thinking, 
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acting, and believing? I find it reasonable to assert that some social phenomena can be attributed 
to socio-biological causes. Similar to non-genetic social facts, genetic socials facts conceptually 
are not the opposite of social, nor are they exhaustively equal to the individual. This is a common 
misunderstanding in the social sciences. We can define genetic social facts as every way of 
acting that displays a coercive character, is general, and is conceptually a unit of analysis 
separated from individual analysis. 
In the same manner that non-genetic facts can be social or asocial, genetic facts can also 
be social and asocial. For example, the specific language we learn is an example of a non-genetic 
social fact. If I learned to speak English and another speaks Spanish, the cause is the non-genetic 
social environment. It depends on the nation or country in which one was born. An example of 
an asocial non-genetic behavior is accidentally walking over a cliff. In this act, there is no social 
effect, just an individual lack of attention. This same dichotomy is also applicable to genetics. 
For example, a random genetic mutation is an asocial genetic fact. It happens in absence of a 
social environment. On the other hand, a genetic social fact can be exemplified by the theories of 
inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971). This biologically 
accounts, normatively, for the basic social unit, the kin group and non-kin interaction, which are 
present across the world. 
Kin selection and reciprocal altruism best illustrate genetic social facts. They are 
theoretical models that provide an evolutionary explanation of social phenomena anchored in 
genetic analysis, not individual analysis. Inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism posit that pro-
social behavior is selected for and can explain familial bonds and cooperative action between 
non-related individuals. 
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The principle of kin altruism is that an individual can transmit their genes to the next 
generation by producing their own offspring or by assisting relatives of common descent. The 
benefit of such altruism is seen in reproductive success and the function of such cost to the 
individual is calculated by the degree of relatedness. The level of selection is genetic because the 
individual will suffer costs at the benefit of others who share similar genetic heritage. The 
individual, then, is not the unit of selection.  
Cases of extreme altruism among related individuals or even milder forms can be 
explained by the theory of inclusive fitness. For example, the act of feeding and providing care 
for offspring can be seen as costs taken by the individual, reducing his or her degree of fitness or 
chances of individual survival. Hamiltons theory (1964) suggests that the degree of assistance 
will be mediated by the degree of genetic relatedness, ensuring that the genetic heritage will 
continue. This act of altruism is a social act, it involves more than just individuals, and it 
presumes sociality. 
Suggesting that altruism among related individuals illustrates a genetic social fact is not 
exactly illustrating macro-level interaction. Non-kin relations represent collective phenomena 
more complex than can be explained by kin altruism. Reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) is a 
theoretical model that attempts to explain cooperative behavior between non-related individuals. 
It provides an evolutionary explanation for collective action. 
We are not beginning from scratch when attempting to model reciprocal altruism. In 
other words, we do not have to resort to individual causality. Reciprocal altruism is not 
dependent on isolated individuals. For example, the theory of inclusive fitness implies that 
individuals are presumed to interact within social groups, i.e., the kin group. This posits the 
starting point of reciprocal altruism, a cooperative/collective environment. 
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DeWaal (1996) illustrates the contingencies of reciprocity as costly to the acting agent. 
There must be a time delay between the initial action and the return. Finally, giving is contingent 
on receiving. The first act appears to be the risky investment sense the certainty of reciprocating 
is unknown. However, such interactions occur within a social context, so some degree of 
familiarity must be assumed between non-kin relationships by the socio-geographic parameters. 
The task within the debate of reciprocal altruism is centered on how non-related 
individuals cooperate, or what mechanisms are responsible for its continuation. The theoretical 
model assumes a cognitive psychological element, a content specific brain (in contrast to the 
blank slate), in the preference for and detection of reciprocating (altruistic) individuals, as well as 
cheaters (Tooby and Cosmides 1992; Crowley, Provencher, Sloane, Dugatikn, Spohn, Rogers, 
Alfieri 1996; Brown ,and Moore 2000). De Vos and Zeggelink (1997) suggest that cooperative 
individuals prefer and have the capacity to recall old-helping partners where the return appears to 
be evident, which they call the social strategy. It also entails the ability to communicate certain 
values such as delayed exchange and simultaneous exchange. In addition, the individual needs 
the ability to view costs and benefits as they are connected to survival and viability. 
Bowles, Gintis, Boyd, and Fehr (2003) suggest that reciprocal altruism, while dependent 
on individual return, provides means for social solidarity through multi-level selection. The 
public goods model used by Bowles, Gintis, Boyd, and Fehr suggest that individuals engaged in 
cooperative environments will punish those who violate reciprocating norms of cooperation at 
personal costs. In other words, the individual will ensue more costs to let the violator know that 
he or she has violated a normative expectancy through coercive means. Group solidarity is 
benefiting from such actions taken by the acting agent as well as the individuals in future 
interactions. 
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Reciprocal altruism is modeled on a general tit for tat interaction. In general, social 
interaction is dependent on returns generated from investments. It is a mutual interest model that 
presumes a social environment. The unit of selection appears to be the genetic individual, who is 
interacting in a social environment expecting a return on investment of time or resources. The 
individual is engaged in a presumed or expected stable environment of mutual self-interest. 
Reciprocal altruism can account for the individuals motive to engage socially in cooperative 
environments. In such a model, individual selection and gene selection are collapsed. In this case 
the genetic individual is continuing to survive while the social character is also preserved 
through reciprocal altruism. It is a social act, it is the relation of two or more, and is a model of 
multi-level selection. 
Reciprocal altruism is not merely a product of a rational mind constantly calculating the 
probability of return and cost. In addition to the rational process, there may also be an emotional 
aspect as well. De Waal (1996) suggests that we also have sympathy-related traits that prompt 
pro-social behavior. He cites numerous examples of primates engaging in altruistic behavior 
towards the recently injured and disabled. The ability to trade places with others in need suggest 
that there is another element involved in producing social behavior, empathy. If we examine the 
constructs of reciprocal altruism, we must be able to recognize someone in need of assistance. 
Therefore, the first act within reciprocal altruism must in some way be motivated by empathy, 
not simply a costs and returns model. 
Evolutionary psychology provides the mediating level between genes and culture. It is 
evident that we are speaking of a content specific brain that in some respect is expecting a certain 
type of environment. In other words, there are learning predispositions or evolutionary expectant 
environments that the brain is oriented towards. While the psychological makeup provides the 
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means to attain a collective/cooperative environment, we must keep in mind that brains are a 
product of genes adapting to environments. Therefore, the psychological makeup of the 
individual is important, but the level of selection is the genetic not the individual. Ultimately, we 
are not reducing social phenomena to individual analysis. 
What should be apparent is that there are levels of analysis within the non-genetic and 
genetic. Suggesting that social facts have a genetic component does not exhaustively assert that it 
is individualistic or non-social. Social phenomena can have a biological basis and this assertion 
is not dependent upon individual causality from a socio-biological perspective. Genetic social 
facts conceptually are not reducible to the individual. However, we must admit the individual is 
its vessel of action. This is true for non-genetic social facts as well. 
We can provide explanations of social behavior and institutions from the genetic and 
non-genetic perspectives. However, I must specify in defense of non-genetic social phenomena 
that all social phenomena cannot be explained biologically. Regardless, genetic social facts meet 
the Durkheimian criteria of coerciveness, generality, and conceptual isolation from the 
individual3. 
Explanation of Genetic Social Facts: Adaptations and Functional Analysis 
  As stated earlier, genetic social facts can be illustrated by the theories of inclusive fitness 
and reciprocal altruism. They can be approached as emotional and cognitive adaptations. In 
treating such phenomena as adaptations we subject them to evolutionary principles, i.e. the 
principle of survival. Therefore, adaptations are seen as the process by which evolution proceeds. 
There are both physiological and behavioral adaptations, i.e. species typical traits. Tooby and 
Cosmides (1992) define adaptation as a system of inherited and reliably developing properties 
                                                
3   Such an assertion rests on the assumption that genotypes underlie and contribute to pheno-typical and behavioral 
traits. Therefore, we can assume from this, genetic social facts would be coercive and general in that they provide 
given dispositions and behaviors. 
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that recurs among members of a species, that become incorporated into the species standard 
design because during the period of their incorporation, they were coordinated with a set of 
statistically recurrent structural properties outside the adaptation, in such a way that the causal 
interaction of the two produced functional outcomes (p.61-62). From an evolutionary 
standpoint, it makes sense to understand how certain physical adaptations better equipped certain 
species to their environments. From the same perspective, it is plausible to assert that certain 
behavioral characteristics are adaptations or species specific traits that ensure better chances of 
survival in the context of the environment. By environment I mean the context in which 
something occurs. Physical adaptations take place in a physical environment or to survival 
problems. There is also an intra-species environment in which certain social behaviors may arise 
and ensure survival in a social aspect. Therefore, genetic social facts should be explained as 
intra-species adaptations. 
In order to explain certain evolutionary social facts, we must engage in functional 
analysis (reverse reasoning) to deduce what evolutionary problem the adaptation originated. In 
other words, adaptations take place due to certain survival problems, whether food 
gathering/hunting, or sharing. Therefore, genetic social facts should be explained in reference to 
the adaptive function they served and to what type of environment it is in response to. Social 
adaptations, then, are to be explained by their evolutionary function. 
Levels of Selection 
  E.O. Wilson writes, Genes hold culture on a leash. The leash is very long, but inevitably 
values will be constrained in accordance with their effects on the gene pool ([1978] 2000:167). 
Sociobiology sees the gene as the basic unit of selection, not the individual nor the group. 
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However, the individual and the group are also beneficiaries and difficult to delineate. In general, 
the genes eye view appears to work on multiple levels. 
Genetic material has two means of survival. They are the survival of the individual who 
can be seen as the carrier of such material, relative fitness. The other means for survival is the 
survival of relatives that carry replications of the genetic content. Dawkins ([1976] 1989) states, 
There are two ways of looking at natural selection, the genes angle and that of the individual. If 
properly understood they are equivalent. Neilson states it another way. The individual 
organism has lost is theoretical centrality as the unit of evolution In many cases where 
behavior benefits the genes are the same as those that benefit the individual, there is no 
difference between gene-level and individual-level selection (1994:269). The survival of the 
individual will obviously ensure the survival of genetic material. This makes it easy to collapse 
the genetic level of analysis with the individual level of analysis.  
One must caution, however, that this is not always the case. An altruistic act, for 
example, can be detrimental to the individual actor at the benefit of the group or others. 
Hamiltons theory of inclusive fitness (1964) serves as a good example of a genetic social fact. 
The theory of inclusive fitness implies that altruistic behavior (pro-social behavior) has a greater 
probability to occur among genetically related individuals providing a genetic explanation for the 
kinship group, which is a relation of two or more. The degree of genetic relatedness mediates 
altruistic behavior between related individuals. At the individual level of analysis, there is no 
payoff for the acting agent without appealing to the genetic element. 
Theoretically, we can separate the genetic level from the individual level of selection. 
Social facts are the products of genetic individuals in relation to environments and arise because 
of utility, i.e., in the survival of genes. This is not to imply that individuals are merely tools for 
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the preservation of social facts (genetic and non-genetic), but we have to admit the individuals 
position is highly constrained by both genetic and non-genetic facts. As Wilson states, In a 
Darwinian sense the organism does not live for itself. Its primary function is not even to 
reproduce other organisms; it reproduces genes, and it serves as their temporary carrier (1975: 
3) . 
While this comes dangerously close to anthropomorphizing genes, it serves as a 
conceptual tool recognizing genetic causality in social behavior. Of course genes could not 
reproduce or even exist without an individual, and individuals without genes. There is a 
necessary relationship between the individual and his or her genes. What is an individual devoid 
of genetic content? What is genetics without an individual? This is a difficult dichotomy to 
make, but it is a conceptual clarification that illustrates the individuals placement in relation to 
social causality. The point is that genetic facts are not necessarily asocial or individualistic. 
Therefore, biological social phenomena are not based on individual analysis and provide an 
organic explanation of certain social phenomena. Durkheim would not reject the proposition that 
pro-social behavior can be explained genetically or evolutionarily. In any case, evolutionary 
causes of social phenomena can be classified and explained as social, as opposed to asocial or 
individualistic. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
Having established that evolutionary explanations of social phenomena are not reducible 
to asocial facts, the sociobiological theoretical paradigm that biological causes of social 
phenomena can be explained and known from an evolutionary framework must be of 
sociological interest. 
Accordingly, adaptations are the mechanism by which evolution proceeds. Therefore, 
from such a framework, sociality can be seen as an adaptation. If genes are the unit of selection, 
then individual and social phenomena can be seen as adaptations for the survival of genes, which 
can imply utility for individuals and social phenomena. Therefore, we can say that genes allow 
for predispositions that ensure their survival. 
If we interpret Durkheims social fact in a socio-environmental perspective exclusively, 
then certain aspects of social phenomena may be missed under the assertion: biological is not 
social. If social phenomena are defined in such a way, we shouldnt grasp that we, as 
sociologists, maintain and hold the right to explain such phenomena by our own conception of it. 
To assert biological phenomena are not capable of producing social phenomena does just that. It 
asserts the Durkheimian social fact is only a socio-environmental phenomenon. 
The concern of sociology, as Durkheim proposed, consists of social phenomena that are 
not reducible to an isolated individual. Collapsing the levels of analysis and mechanisms of 
transmission serves to isolate social phenomena from biological phenomena. If social 
phenomena are merely socio-environmental phenomena, then conditions of social phenomena at 
all levels are separated from the human condition. 
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If the standard social science model incorporates an evolutionary framework, it is not 
reduced to individual analysis. Supplementing social facts with an evolutionary theory serves to 
better equip sociology as a science. Whether or not the cause is genetic or non-genetic, social 
phenomena are the concern of sociology.  
Sociobiology is seen as being concerned with the study and explanation of genetic social 
facts. While this certainly constitutes only a part of the sociological endeavor, it has tremendous 
capabilities to change the way certain social phenomena are perceived and explained, especially 
concerning collective action. 
Sociobiology identifies two principle types of pro-social behavior:  Hamiltons (1964) 
theory of inclusive fitness and Trivers (1971) model of reciprocal altruism. Such theoretical 
models explain social phenomena from a biological perspective and provide an explanation of 
social cohesion. Sociobiology explains prosocial behavior as an adaptive quality benefiting the 
survival of ones genetic content. While this may suggest that the individual is causal in some 
fashion to social behavior by collapsing the individual/genetic levels of analysis, it does not posit 
that the individual is the ultimate cause. However, the individual constitutes the vessel of 
survival and transmission. In other words, the individual is the beholder of adaptive traits. 
If collective phenomena can be explained from an evolutionary perspective as 
adaptations, then the theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism can account for the 
genesis of certain social phenomena through selected behaviors and they can be seen in much the 
same way social facts are perceived: as coercive, general, and independent of the individual. 
Social phenomena such as kin grouping and social exchange reflect the underlying bio-psycho-
social elements of the human condition. 
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Sociology, in a non-evolutionary perspective, has a problem accounting for collective 
action. The Durkheimian approach assumes such conduct is based on the influence of social facts 
molding individuals to act socially, which as previously discussed has problems accounting for 
the genesis of such facts. On the other hand, rational choice (utilitarian social theory) theory 
assumes individual utility maximization, which cannot account for collective action because 
there would be no certainty to maximize individual utility through collective goods at the 
individual level. Both approaches to collective action either fail to account for the genesis of the 
collective nature or cannot account for continued collective action. 
A sociobiological approach to collective action seen as an evolutionary adaptation can 
provide an account of such social phenomena. Trivers (1971) and Hamiltons (1964) theoretical 
models can provide useful insights concerning the genesis and continued cooperative nature of 
social behavior. In general, if social phenomena are not contrary to biological/evolutionary 
phenomena, then sociology can approach certain theoretical problems with renewed interest from 
an evolutionary perspective. This move places sociology within the realm of the human 
condition providing a better angle to explain the continuity and utility of social behavior without 
reducing it ultimately to individual causality. 
To separate such a complex phenomena into distinct non-related categories, such as 
social, biological, and psychological, only serves to hinder a cohesive analysis of the human 
social condition. Social phenomena presuppose biological and psychological phenomena. 
Therefore, social phenomena represent a complex set of variables, some genetic, some not. In 
such regard, sociology is unique in that it studies a phenomenon like no other,  the relation of 
two or more bio-psycho-social individuals. 
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